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Abstract
In the game-theoretic model war of attrition, players are subject to an explicit
cost proportional to the duration of contests. We construct a model where the
time cost is not explicitly given, but instead depends implicitly on the strategies of
the whole population. We identify and analyse the underlying mechanisms
responsible for the implicit time cost. Each player participates in a series of games,
where those prepared to wait longer win with higher certainty but play less
frequently. The model is characterised by the ratio of the winner’s score to the
loser’s score, in a single game. The fitness of a player is determined by the
accumulated score from the games played during a generation. We derive the
stationary distribution of strategies under the replicator dynamics. When the
score ratio is high, we find that the stationary distribution is unstable, with
respect to both evolutionary and dynamical stability, and the dynamics converge
to a limit cycle. When the ratio is low, the dynamics converge to the stationary
distribution. For an intermediate interval of the ratio, the distribution is
dynamically but not evolutionarily stable. Finally, the implications of our results
for previous models based on the war of attrition are discussed.
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1 Introduction
In many interactions between individuals, the time that passes from the
start to the separation may be of importance for how to evaluate the
outcome for the participants. Most game-theoretic situations do not take this
into account, but it is generally assumed that the time passed is independent
of the strategies. In the war of attrition, originally introduced by
Maynard Smith and Price (1973), the length of the interaction is explicitly
accounted for by a cost directly affecting the score for the players. Our
starting-point will be the situation described and motivated in the
introduction to Chapter 3 in (Maynard-Smith, 1982). This is a waiting-game
for two players, where the one who gives up and quits gets a smaller reward,
the consolation prize k < 1 compared to the score 1 for the one who stays,
but both pay a cost c t, where t is the duration of the game and c is a
positive constant. The cost does not necessarily come from the contest itself;
the engagement in a contest may take time from possible alternative
activities, for example, there is less time to gather resources for survival and
reproduction. A strategy is a certain waiting-time that the player is prepared
to wait unless the opponent finishes before. When two players meet the one
with the largest waiting-time wins, and in case of a draw both get (1 + k)/2.
In the game of attrition, as stated above, there is a mixed strategy defining a
Nash equilibrium for the game, given by the probability density
p(x) = c/(1− k) e−c x/(1−k), where x is the waiting-time. It should be noted
though, that Nash equilibria are also given by strategy pairs where one has
waiting-time 0 and the other waits long enough, for example by always
waiting at least (1− k)/c. These are the only types of Nash equilibria that
can exist in this game.
If the game is put into a co-evolutionary context, using replicator dynamics,
it is known that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium corresponds to an
evolutionarily stable population mixture of pure strategies (Maynard Smith,
1974). In this case, with an explicit time cost, the consolation prize k is not
critical since the fitness can be transformed to the case with k = 0 by an
affine transformation (multiplication with a positive constant and
subtraction by any constant), that does not affect the evolutionary dynamics
of the population. Bishop and Cannings (1978) study generalised score
functions for this game.
It is clear that if there is no cost associated with the duration of a contest,
waiting forever is a Nash equilibrium. But if we study this game in a
co-evolutionary context, we may implicitly include a cost of time by letting
those who are involved a shorter time in the games participate in a larger
number of games, allowing them to accumulate a higher score. In this case,
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the consolation prize k for the loser plays a crucial role.
In this paper, we investigate the characteristics of the co-evolutionary
dynamics of a population interacting according to the game of attrition with
no explicit time cost. The players in the population can be in one of two
states: either they are involved in a contest with another player, or they are
available for entering a new contest. The activity of the players in the
population, during a generation, is modelled as a process that randomly
selects pairs of available players to engage in contests. This leads to an
implicit time cost, which is higher for players involved in longer games. In
particular we investigate the existence of stationary distributions and how
their stability depends on the consolation prize k, the only free parameter in
the model.
The war of attrition has been extended in various ways, including
multi-person games (Haigh and Cannings, 1989) and generalisations of the
payoff structure (Bishop and Cannings, 1978).
Cannings and Whittaker (1995) studied a modification of the model by
Maynard-Smith (1982) similar to the one we present. They suggest a
mechanism that implies more games for players that finish faster, but keep
the explicit time cost. Unlike our model, their approach is restricted to
positive integer waiting-times. The time between games is always one unit of
time, the same as the smallest possible waiting-time. In Section 9 their
model is discussed in more detail. Other variants of their model are
presented in (Cannings and Whittaker, 1994; Whittaker, 1996), where a
fixed amount of resource is to be divided between a number of contests based
on the war of attrition.
An earlier study, by Hines (1977, 1978) also takes into account that
strategies determine the number of games played. Hines analyses a model
where animals forage for food. When an animal finds a piece of food, with a
given probability it may consume the food undisturbed, otherwise it enters a
war of attrition for the food parcel. The details of the model is described in
Section 9, where we also discuss the implications of our results for the model
by Hines.
The paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, we describe the details of the
social dynamics model that governs how pairs of individuals engage in
games. In Section 3, we present how the long-term changes in the
composition of strategies in the population is governed by the replicator
dynamics. In Sections 4 and 5, the stationary distribution for deterministic
strategies under the replicator dynamics is derived. The stability analysis of
the stationary distribution is presented in Section 6, with details shown in
Appendix A. In Section 7 we study the long-term evolution of the dynamics,
3
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the processes in the social dynamics. Players with strategies
x and y meet and engage in contests. When a contest ends, the participants return
to the available state. The number of individuals of strategy x in the available state
is nx, and the number of ongoing contests between players with these strategies
is given by npxy, for a given pair of strategies (x, y). The rates at which contests
start and end are given along the arrows, where τxy is the expected duration of a
(x, y)-game, and N is the whole population size. The dotted arrows connect to the
nodes for other pairs.
from different initial distributions. In Section 8, we show how models with an
explicit time cost can be mapped to our model. In Section 9 we relate or
model to the models of Hines and Cannings and Whittaker. We conclude
with summarising and discussing our results in Section 10.
2 Social dynamics model
Consider a population of N individuals. During the course of one generation,
an individual experiences a series of encounters with other individuals. It is
assumed that a fraction of the encounters lead to a conflict, from competing
interests, which is resolved through a contest. We assume that no more than
two players meet in the same contest, so that only pair-wise interactions are
considered. Thus, the state of the whole population is controlled by two
processes: one in which available players form pairs and become engaged in
contests, and one in which pairs break up and make players available. See
Fig. 1 for an illustration of these processes. We denote the combined
processes the social dynamics of the population.
A contest between two individuals, with waiting-times x and y, takes the
form of the war of attrition game. In general, x and y may be stochastic
variables, reflecting mixed strategies. From Section 4 and onward, we focus
on pure strategies. The duration of the game is given by the smallest of the
waiting-times. The player with the largest waiting-time gets the score 1, and
the other player gets the consolation prize, i.e., the score k, with 0 < k < 1.
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If both players have the same waiting-time, they both get an expected score
of (1 + k)/2.
At each instant a fraction pa of the population is available for playing, while
the rest of the individuals are engaged in pair-wise contests. The total
number of players with strategy x in the population is denoted by ntotx , the
number of available players with waiting-time x is given by nx, and the
number of ongoing games between the players with waiting-times x and y is
npxy. It is convenient to treat the pairs (x, y) and (y, x) separately; though
they are equivalent, it simplifies the calculations.
We assume that the time intervals between games are independent. Available
players form ordered pairs (x, y) for playing according to a Poisson process
with rate µ(pa)nx (ny − δxy)/N , where δxy equals one if x = y and zero
otherwise. Note that time is measured in units of N for convenience: the
number of events per unit of time remain finite for large N . The rate µ(pa) is
a positive function of the fraction of available players, and may be used to
model how the social dynamics depends on the availability of players. For a
player, the expected time between the end of one contest and the onset of
the next is [2 pa µ(pa)]
−1. We illustrate the choice of µ(pa) by two examples.
First, a model where players perform random walks, and occasionally meet
and play. This corresponds to constant µ(pa). Second, a model where the
expected time between games for a player is independent of the number of
available players, corresponds to taking µ(pa) ∝ p−1a . In general, we assume
that µ(pa) is chosen so that the expected time between games for a player is
decreasing with pa or constant, and is bounded for 0 ≤ pa ≤ 1.
When the population is finite, the social dynamics forms a Markov process
and we know that there is a unique stationary distribution characterising the
distribution of strategies in the different states.
In general, we should expect that players who are prepared to wait for a
longer time (before finishing a game) enter the available state less frequently,
and it is this effect that will result in an implicit time cost. We can find the
equilibrium distribution, i.e., the expectation value of the number of
individuals and pairs, by using the requirement that the expected number of
pairs formed equals the number of pairs that finish playing, per unit of time:
〈npxy〉
τxy
=
µ(pa)
N
〈nx〉 (〈ny〉 − δxy) , (1)
where τxy is the expected duration of a game between a pair of players with
strategies x and y, respectively. By counting players with strategy x that are
5
available or playing, we get the relation
ntotx = 〈nx〉+ 2
∑
y
〈npxy〉 = 〈nx〉+ 2
µ(pa)
N
∑
y
τxy〈nx〉 (〈ny〉 − δxy) , (2)
which can be used to solve for the equilibrium distribution for players in the
available state, given a certain overall distribution of strategies.
We now focus on large populations. In the limit of large N , we take u(x) to
be the distribution of the waiting-time x in the population (u(x) ∼ ntotx /N),
and ρ(x) to be the distribution of x among the available players
(ρ(x) ∼ nx/∑y ny). In the limit of many players it is convenient to consider
a general distribution of waiting-times. Thus, (2) becomes
u(x) = pa ρ(x) + 2 p
2
aµ(pa)
∫ ∞
0
τ(x, y) ρ(x) ρ(y) dy, (3)
where τ(x, y) is the expected duration of a game between players with
strategies x and y. Note that different strategy spaces may be modelled by
the appropriate function τ(x, y) of x and y, where now x (and y) is a
parameter characterising the strategy rather than the explicit waiting-time.
For instance, the set of mixed strategies with exponentially distributed
waiting-times may be characterised by the expected waiting-time.
Since the expected time between contests for a player is [2 pa µ(pa)]
−1, the
expected number of games per unit of time is
NG(x) =
[
1
2 pa µ(pa)
+
∫ ∞
0
τ(x, y) ρ(y) dy
]−1
. (4)
We may now express u(x) as
u(x) = 2 p2a µ(pa) ρ(x)/NG(x). (5)
As an alternative, we may derive (5) from the ergodicity of the system. The
fraction of the population with parameter x that is in the available state is
pa ρ(x)/u(x). A player with parameter x spend a fraction NG(x)/[2 pa µ(pa)]
of the time in the available state. Since the onsets of two consecutive
contests are assumed to be uncorrelated, the two fractions must be equal,
and we again arrive at (5).
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3 Evolutionary dynamics
It is assumed that the population evolves so that players with strategies that
get higher scores per unit time increase their fraction of the population,
leading to a change in the distribution u(x, t) at time t. Further, it is
assumed that the evolutionary dynamics and the social dynamics occur on
separate time scales so that the equilibrium distribution given by (3) can be
used to determine the scores of the different players. Then, on the
evolutionary time scale, the population dynamics is given by the replicator
dynamics,
∂u(x, t)
∂t
= u(x, t)
[
f(x, t)− f¯(t)
]
, (6)
where f(x, t) is the expected fitness of a player with strategy x, per unit of
time in the social dynamics, and f¯(t) is the average fitness in the whole
population at time t,
f¯(t) =
∫ ∞
0
u(x, t) f(x, t) dx.
To simplify the notation, let us suppress the explicit time dependence in the
notation and write u(x) for u(x, t) etc. The expected fitness of a player with
strategy x is the product of two factors, the expected score per game and the
number of games per unit of time:
f(x) = NG(x)
∫ ∞
0
[ k + (1− k)P (x, y) ] ρ(y) dy, (7)
where P (x, y) is the probability that a player with strategy x is the winner
in a game against a player with strategy y.
A player can increase the expected score per game by waiting longer, but
that will decrease the number of games played per unit of time, and we get
an implicit cost due to the longer engagement in the games. Therefore,
whether it is advantageous for a player to increase or decrease the
waiting-time depends on the distribution of strategies in the population.
Note that the sum of the scores in each game is 1 + k, and the total number
of games per unit of time is 2p2aµ(pa). From this we see a general connection
between average fitness and the fraction of available players:
Lemma 1 When the population is in equilibrium with respect to the social
dynamics, the average fitness in the population is
f¯ = p2
a
µ(p
a
) (1 + k), (8)
for any set of strategies.
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Fig. 2. The time evolution of the distribution of waiting-times in the population, in
the case of constant µ(pa), for consolation price k = 0.1 (left) and k = 0.3 (right).
For clarity, we show the distribution of the base-10 logarithm of the waiting-time in
the population. The colour-bars show the value corresponding to each colour in the
figures. For k = 0.1, the dynamics seems to converge to a stable limit cycle, and for
k = 0.3 it seems to converge to a stationary distribution.
4 Deterministic strategies
The formalism presented in the previous sections applies to both pure and
mixed strategies. In the following, we assume pure strategies, so that each
player is prepared to wait a given time x, and the population is then
characterised by a distribution u(x) over the waiting-times. When a player A
with strategy x meets a player B with strategy y, the probability of winning
for player A is P (x, y) = θ(x− y), where θ(z) is one if z > 0, 1/2 if z = 0 and
zero otherwise. The duration of the game is given by τ(x, y) = min(x, y).
When there is an atom at infinity (i.e., a finite share of the population with
infinite waiting-time), the players that wait indefinitely always get a fitness
of zero, since the expected score per game is bounded from above by one,
and the expected time per game is infinite (c.f. (7)). Thus, this strategy is
dominated by all other strategies, and in the following we assume there is no
atom at infinity.
In Fig. 2, we show the time evolution of the distribution of waiting-times in
the population, in the case of constant µ(pa), for consolation price k = 0.1
and k = 0.3, from numerical integration of the replicator dynamics (c.f. (6)).
The initial distribution is taken to be proportional to the inverse
waiting-time over the interval shown in the figure, and zero elsewhere. For
k = 0.1, we find that the dynamics seems to converge to a limit cycle, and
for k = 0.3 it seems to converge to a stationary distribution.
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5 Stationary distributions
The numerical simulations show that the systems seems to converge to a
stationary distribution for some values of the consolation prize k. In this
section, we derive the form of this distribution.
A stationary distribution u(x) is determined by the requirement f(x) = f¯
wherever u(x) > 0. With the cumulative distribution of the available players,
Φ(x) =
∫ x
0 ρ(y) dy, we can use (4) and (7) to express the stationarity
condition as
Φ(x) + k
(
1− Φ(x)
)
= f¯
[
1
2 pa µ(pa)
+
∫ x
0
y ρ(y) dy + x
(
1− Φ(x)
)]
. (9)
Next, we take the derivative of this equation with respect to x:
(1− k) ρ(x) = f¯ [ x ρ(x)− x ρ(x) + 1− Φ(x) ] = f¯ [ 1− Φ(x) ].
Since Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(∞) = 1, we see that there is a unique solution
Φ(x) = 1− e−λx where λ = f¯
1− k = p
2
a µ(pa)
1 + k
1− k (10)
by Lemma 1. By inserting the solution (10) into (9) we find the fraction of
available players in the population:
pa =
2 k
1 + k
.
Given the distribution of strategies among the available players, the
distribution u(x) of strategies in the population can be calculated from (3).
The results are summarised in the following theorem:
Theorem 2 In a population of players with deterministic waiting-times,
there is a unique stationary distribution u(x) involving all strategies x, given
by
u(x) =
2 λ
1 + k
[
e−λx − (1− k) e−2λx
]
, where λ =
4 k2
1− k2 µ(
2 k
1 + k
). (11)
The fraction of available players is then p
a
= 2 k/(1 + k) and the expected
fitness of all players is
f¯ =
4 k2
1 + k
µ
( 2 k
1 + k
)
.
Furthermore, the distribution of strategies among the available players is
exponentially distributed:
ρ(x) = λ e−λx.
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Fig. 3. The stationary distribution u(x) for the consolation prize k = 0.1 (solid
line), k = 0.17 (dashed line) and k = 0.3 (dashed and dotted line).
From Theorem 2, we obtain the distribution of strategies amongst the
players engaged in games at the stationary distribution as
u(x)− pa ρ(x)
1− pa = 2λe
−λx − 2λe−2λx.
The stationary distribution is shown in Fig. 3 for three values of the
consolation prize k. The strategies of the available players are exponentially
distributed, as is the stationary distribution in the original war of attrition
(Maynard Smith, 1974). In our model, however, the stationary distribution is
decreasing for short waiting-times. This is due to that strategies with short
waiting-time are over-represented among the available players, compared to
the distribution of strategies in the population. Of the players with
waiting-time x, a fraction pa ρ(x)/u(x) = k/[1− (1− k) exp(−λx)] is in the
available state, at the stationary distribution. This means that, despite the
risk for getting stuck in long games, players with long waiting-times will
spend at least a fraction k of their time in the available state.
6 Stability of the stationary distribution
Although there exist stationary distributions for all k ∈ (0, 1) as seen in
Fig. 3, we note from Fig. 2 that there could be a fundamental difference in
the dynamics for different consolation prizes k. In order to better understand
the dynamics of the model, we investigate the stability of the stationary
distribution (11), as function of the consolation prize k. We give analytical
results for infinitesimal perturbations of the stationary distribution, as well
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as results from numerical simulations, in order to explore the global
convergence to the stationary distribution.
Both the stationary distribution u(x) and the distribution of strategies
among available players, ρ(x), are polynomials in e−λx. In order to simplify
the analysis of the stability of the stationary distribution, and also to
facilitate more accurate simulations, we map the strategy x to a point s in
the unit interval through
s = e−λx with λ =
4 k2
1− k2 µ
( 2 k
1 + k
)
.
Thus the whole range of waiting-times [0,∞) is represented by the interval
(0, 1]. The distribution of s in the population is then
us(s) = u(−λ−1 ln s)/(λs). Similarly, we define fs(s) as the fitness of a player
with parameter s.
In order to be specific, in the following we restrict the analysis of the
stability properties to the case where µ(pa) is constant. It is straight-forward
to extend the analysis to other µ(pa). With the functions
g(s)=
1 + k
2 k
1
λ s
pa ρ(− ln s
λ
) and
h(s)= k + (1− k)λ
∫ 1
0
τ(− ln s
λ
,− ln t
λ
) g(t) dt,
we can express (5) as
us(s) = 2 g(s) h(s)/(1 + k). (12)
Note that g(s) is proportional to the distribution of s among the available
players. For convenience, we now measure time in units of f¯ in the
stationary distribution, 4k2/(1 + k). In the new units, we have
fs(s) = m(s)/h(s) and f¯ = gˆ
2, where
m(s) =
∫ 1
0
S(− ln s
λ
,− ln t
λ
) g(t) dt and gˆ =
∫ 1
0
g(t) dt.
The time evolution of the distribution of s, (6), is then
∂us(s)
∂t
=
2
1 + k
g(s) [m(s)− gˆ2 h(s) ].
For deterministic strategies, we have
11
τ(− ln s
λ
,− ln t
λ
)=−1
λ
max( ln s, ln t )
S(− ln s
λ
,− ln t
λ
)= θ(t− s) + k θ(s− t),
so at the stationary distribution (11) we get g(s) = gˆ = 1 and
h(s) = m(s) = 1− (1− k)s. Thus, in the parameter s the stationary
distribution becomes
us(s) = 2 [1− (1− k)s] /(1 + k). (13)
6.1 Evolutionary stability
There are many different ways of characterising the stability of a distribution
under the evolutionary dynamics in the literature (see e.g. Hines (1987) for a
review). One of the most commonly used definitions of stability is to test
whether the stationary distribution can resist an invasion from a population
with distribution qs(s) at a level η, for all positive values of η in a
neighbourhood of zero. The distribution of strategies in the population after
the invasion is thus (1− η) us(s) + η qs(s). Then us(s) is an evolutionarily
stable distribution if and if only the expected fitness among the players in
the old distribution is higher than the fitness among the invaders:
∫ 1
0
us(s) f˜s(s) ds >
∫ 1
0
qs(s) f˜s(s) ds,
where f˜s(s) is the fitness of a player with strategy s in the population with
distribution u˜s(s). Now expand f˜s(s) for small η:
f˜s(s) = fs(s) + δfs(s) η +O(η
2), where δfs(s) = F [ δus(s) ] is a functional of
the perturbation δus(s) = u˜s(s)− us(s). Since fs(s) = f¯ at the stationary
distribution,
∫ 1
0
[ us(s)− qs(s) ] fs(s) ds =
∫ 1
0
[ us(s)− qs(s) ] f¯ ds = 0,
so us(s) is evolutionarily stable if and only if for all small enough
perturbations δus(s),
∫ 1
0
δus(s)F [ δus(s) ] ds < 0.
Since we know how to calculate the distribution us(s) from the distribution
of available players, it is convenient to express a perturbation δus(s) as a
12
perturbation in the availability of the strategies using (12):
δus(s) =
2
1 + k
L[ δg(s) ] where L[ δg(s) ] = δ[ g(s)h(s) ].
At the stationary distribution, we get
L[ δg(s) ] = [ 1− (1− k)s ] δg(s)− (1− k)
∫ 1
0
max(ln s, ln t) δg(t) dt.
Since δus(s) is normalised to zero, we have that the corresponding
perturbation δg(s) must obey
0 =
∫ 1
0
L[δg(s)] ds =
∫ 1
0
[ 2− k − 2 (1− k) s ] δg(s) ds. (14)
With δfs(s) = B[ δg(s) ], we find
B[ δg(s) ] = δ[ m(s)
h(s)
] =
δm(s) h(s)−m(s) δh(s)
h(s)2
=
δm(s)− δh(s)
1− (1− k) s
at the stationary distribution (13), where
δm(s)− δh(s) =
∫ s
0
ds [ k+ (1− k) ln s ] δg(t) +
∫ 1
s
ds [ 1 + (1− k) ln t ] δg(t).
Thus us(s) is not evolutionarily stable if we can find a perturbation δg(s)
such that
M[ δg(s) ] =
∫ 1
0
L[ δg(s) ]B[ δg(s) ] ds > 0.
We expand the perturbation δg(s) in the shifted Legendre polynomials P¯i(s)
(Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972), and maximise M[ δg(s) ] subject to the
normalisation condition (14) and
∫ 1
0 L[ δg(s) ]2 ds = 1. In order to find a
numerical solution, we restrict the analysis to the n+ 1 first Legendre
polynomials: δg(s) =
∑n
i=0 gi P¯i(s). Ignoring the higher order polynomials
amounts to ignoring highly oscillatory contributions to the perturbation
δg(s).
With n = 50 we find that for k < k∗ess ≈ 0.5196 there is a positive maximum
of M[ δg(s) ], but when k > k∗ess all extreme values are negative. Thus we
have evidence that there is no evolutionarily stable strategy for k < k∗ess. For
k > k∗ess we have not shown that the distribution is evolutionarily stable, but
that it is likely so. The value k∗ess seems not to be sensitive to the number of
Legendre polynomials n used in the expansion of δg(s), when n & 30.
We have also performed these calculations for the case µ(pa) ∝ p−1a . For
n = 50 we find k∗ess ≈ 0.6738, and again the value of k∗ess seems to converge
when n is large enough (i.e. n & 30).
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Note that, in Fig. 2, the distribution seems to converge to the stationary
distribution for k as low as 0.3. This indicates that evolutionary stability of
the stationary distribution implies dynamical stability, but that the converse
does not hold. In the following section, we address this issue.
6.2 Dynamical stability
We examine the long-term response of the replicator dynamics to a small
perturbation δus(s) in the composition of the population, around the
stationary solution:
∂δus(s)
∂t
=
2
1 + k
δ[ g(s)m(s)− gˆ2 g(s) h(s) ]. (15)
With the linear operator A[δg(s)] = δ[ g(s)m(s)− gˆ2 g(s) h(s) ], we may
write (15) in terms of the time evolution of the corresponding perturbation
δg(s) as:
∂
∂t
L[δg(s)] = A[δg(s)]. (16)
Note that the perturbation δg(s) is subject to the constraint (14). See
Appendix A for the details of A. In order to find whether a perturbation
δg(s) grows or decays, we look for solutions to (16) on the form
δg(s) = φ(s) eγt, where t is the evolutionary time. The perturbation δg(s)
grows if and only if γ has a positive real part. Thus, we find that γ and φ(s)
must be solutions to the generalised eigenvalue problem
γ L[φ(s)] = A[φ(s)]. (17)
Note that this is equivalent to solving the eigenvalue equation
∂
∂t
δus(s) = γ δus(s).
In order to find good (numerical) approximations for the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors, we again expand the linear operators L and A in the n+ 1 first
shifted Legendre polynomials, so the eigenvector φ(s) is determined by the
coefficients ai in the expansion φ(s) =
∑n
i=0 ai P¯i(s). See Appendix A for
details of how to solve for the coefficients ai numerically.
The perturbation corresponding to an eigenvector φ(s) grows at a rate given
by the real part of the corresponding eigenvalue, Re γ. The growth rate for
the different eigenvectors are shown in Fig. 4, as a function of the consolation
prize k. For k∗dyn < k < 1, where k
∗
dyn ≈ 0.1675, there is no eigenvalue with
positive real part. The value of k∗dyn does not seem to be sensitive to the
number of Legendre polynomials in the expansion, when n is large enough
(n & 20). Thus, in this region all sufficiently small perturbations will decay
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Fig. 4. The real part of the 11 largest eigenvalues (ordered by modulus) as a function
of the consolation prize k, from the expansion in the 51 first Legendre polynomials.
We also show the growth rate for a small perturbation, estimated from simulations
(white circles) for some values of k.
asymptotically, and the stationary distribution us(s) is dynamically stable.
As a consequence of this, the population will resist invasion of any mixed
strategy, except the strategy p(x) = λ e−λx, where x is the waiting-time and
λ is given by Theorem 2. This strategy mimics a randomly chosen available
player in the stationary distribution, so all players get the same fitness values
as before. We also show an estimate of the growth rate from simulations (see
the circles in Fig. 4), and find good agreement with the growth rate predicted
by the leading eigenvalue, in the region where the growth rate is positive.
In general, a perturbation does not only grow or decay but also oscillates
with characteristic frequencies. In Fig. 5 we show the period of these
oscillations, given by 2π/|Im γ|, as a function of k. The black points indicate
where the real part of the eigenvalue becomes positive (see Fig. 4).
Estimated values from simulations are shown as white circles, and we find
good agreement with the period rate predicted by the leading eigenvalue.
When µ(pa) ∝ p−1a , the calculations of the dynamical stability gives
k∗dyn ≈ 0.1197, when n = 50. We find as before, that this limit converges
quickly for n large enough (i.e. n & 20).
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Fig. 5. The period 2pi/|Im γ| as a function of the consolation prize k, where Im γ
is the imaginary part of the eigenvalue γ. For each eigenvalue, the curve is drawn
solid where the real part is positive, and is drawn dashed where it is negative. The
black dots shows the points of transition from negative to positive real parts, and
the number by the dots is the number of the eigenvalue when sorted by decreas-
ing magnitude. We also show the period of a small perturbation, estimated from
simulations (white circles) for some values of k.
7 Long-term evolution as a function of the initial distribution
In order to assess the global convergence of the dynamics to the stationary
distribution (c.f. Fig. 2), we have compared the asymptotic evolution of us(s)
when started from different initial distributions: us(s) = 1, us(s) = 2(1− s),
us(s) = 2(1 + s)/3, us(s) = 2s, and us(s) = 6s(1− s). In the simulations, the
continuous parameter space [0, 1] was approximated by 1, 000 equally spaced
atoms in the interval (0, 1), and time was divided into discrete steps of 0.1
units of time. The first 20, 000 units of time was considered transient, and
was discarded. The deviation from the stationary distribution
u∗s(s) = 2 [1− (1− k)s] /(1 + k) was then measured at 100 times, 10 units of
time apart, by the Kullback distance (Kullback, 1959)
K[us(s); u
∗
s(s)] =
∫ 1
0
u∗s(s) ln
u∗s(s)
us(s)
ds.
The Kullback distance is always non-negative, and since u∗s(s) ≥ 0 for all s,
it is zero if and only if us(s) = u
∗
s(s) for all s (Kullback, 1959). Second, the
Kullback distance is invariant under a change of variables, so it does not
matter which parameter (e.g. x or s) we use to characterise a strategy. From
the samples we estimate the time average and standard deviation of the
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Fig. 6. The asymptotic time-averaged Kullback distance K[us(s);u
∗
s(s)] from the
stationary distribution u∗s(s) (see (13)) to the distribution us(s), from five differ-
ent initial distributions (white circles). The points corresponding to one standard
deviation up and down is shown as black dots, with one dot for each initial dis-
tribution. Solid lines are averages over all initial distributions. The dotted vertical
line show k = 0.17, denoting the point where the stationary distribution becomes
stable. Convergence to the stationary distribution is slow for k close to one, since
the fitness differences are small. Note that the results are almost indistinguishable
for the five different initial distributions.
distance. In Fig. 6 we show the asymptotic average Kullback distance, plus
and minus one standard deviation, as a function of k for the different initial
distributions above.
We summarise the results from these experiments as follows: First, for
k > 0.17 we find that the distribution of waiting-times converges to the
stationary distribution for the initial distributions above. Second, for
k < 0.17 we find that the average of the asymptotic distance, and also its
standard deviation, is almost identical for the initial distributions above.
Inspection of the time evolution of the distribution gives that the dynamics
seems to converge to a limit cycle (c.f. Fig. 2 for an example). This indicates
that the dynamics converge to stable limit cycle for these values of k. Third,
since the initial distributions was chosen to be very different (some
dominated by large waiting-times, some by low waiting-times and other
intermediate) we conjecture that these results hold for any initial
distribution with full support.
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8 Explicit time cost
We return to models of an explicit cost for the duration of a contest. Let
S(x) be the expected score per game for a player with waiting-time x (the
cost not included), and let D(x) be expected duration of a contest. Suppose
the cost per unit of time during the contest is c. The expected fitness is then
given by
f(x) = NG(x) [S(x)− cD(x)] .
Since by (4), NG(x) = [ 1/ν +D(x) ]
−1 where ν = 2 pa µ(pa), we have
f(x) = NG(x)S(x)− c + cNG(x)/ν.
Note that since NG(x) is decreasing with the waiting-time, players with
small waiting-time are less influenced by a high cost c, compared to players
with higher waiting-time.
The average fitness in the population is by (5) and (8):
f¯ =
∫ ∞
0
pa ν ρ(x)
NG(x)
[NG(x)S(x)− c+ cNG(x)/ν] dx
= pa ν
1 + k
2
− c+ c pa = (1 + k) p2a µ(pa)− c (1− pa).
Thus, the average fitness is lowered by a factor c (1− pa) by the introduction
of the cost c.
We derive the stationary distribution with positive cost c from
S(x)− cD(x) = f¯ [ 1/ν +D(x) ]
by letting f(x) = f¯ as in Section 5. We find that for any cost c > 0, there is
a unique stationary distribution u(x) involving all strategies x, given by
u(x) = (2− pa)λ e−λx − (1− pa) 2λ e−2λx
where λ = p2a µ(pa)/(1− pa). The fraction of available players pa is the
solution to
2 k pa µ(pa)− (1 + k) p2a µ(pa) + c (1− pa) = 0. (18)
The distribution of strategies among the available players is ρ(x) = λ e−λx.
Note that since µ(pa) is assumed to be bounded, pa → 1 as c→∞ in order
to fulfill (18). In the limit of c = 0 we recover pa = 2k/(1 + k), and for c > 0
we have pa > 2k/(1 + k). We now give the solution to (18) for two cases of
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special interest: for constant µ(pa) and for µ(pa) ∝ p−1a , we have
pa =
2 k − c+
√
(2 k − c)2 + 4 (1 + k) c
2 (1 + k)
and pa =
2 k + c
1 + k + c
, respectively.
We will now show that one can find a k˜, such that the fitness of the strategy
with explicit time cost c and the consolation prize k, equals the fitness of the
strategy with no explicit cost and the consolation prize k˜.
With the probability of winning a game, P (x) =
∫ x
0 ρ(y) dy, we have the
expected score S(x) = k + (1− k)P (x), and thus the fitness f(x) may be
written
f(x) =
(
c
ν
+ k
)
NG(x) + (1− k)NG(x)P (x)− c.
We compare this expression to the fitness of the strategy when k = k˜ and
c = 0:
fc= 0(x) = k˜ NG(x) + (1− k˜)NG(x)P (x).
Since the growth rate of a strategy is proportional to the difference between
the fitness of the strategy and the average fitness in the population, it does
not matter if we add a number to all fitness values and multiply them with a
positive number. Note that these numbers may change with time, as long as
they are the same for all strategies. Thus, we see that if we set
fc= 0(x)/(1− k˜) = (f(x) + c)/(1− k)
we get equality for all x if and only if
k˜
1− k˜ =
c/ν + k
1− k ⇔ k˜ = 1−
1− k
1 + c/ν
. (19)
Note that c/(c+ ν) ≤ k˜ ≤ 1 for all k, and especially k˜ > k when c > 0.
When the expected time between games, ν, is independent of the fraction of
available players in the population, µ(pa) ∝ p−1a , then c/ν is constant in
time. It follows that the dynamical equations are exactly the same for both
sets of parameters, apart from a scaling of the evolutionary time.
When ν depends on pa, we cannot map the dynamics for a given
combination of k and c onto k = k˜ and c = 0, since the equivalent
consolation price k˜ would then change with time (unless the population is
stationary). However, since k˜ increases with decreasing ν according to (19),
we expect that the domain of stability is increased significantly.
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9 Comparison to other models
In this section, we discuss how our results pertain to the models of
Cannings and Whittaker (1994) and Hines (1977).
9.1 The model of Hines
In Hines’ model animals forage for food, and the events of finding food are
assumed to be a Poisson process with rate α per animal. Each food parcel
corresponds to one fitness unit. Sometimes the animal gets to consume the
food parcel without challenge, but with probability π the animal is
challenged and enters a war of attrition for the food parcel. The time spent
foraging and in contests are assumed to be statistically independent. During
foraging, the animal has energy consumption µF fitness units per unit of
time, and during a contest the corresponding energy consumption is µC
fitness units per unit of time.
Since the evolutionary dynamics modelled by replicator dynamics is
invariant when the fitness undergo addition of constants and multiplication
by positive constants, we find a relation between the the consolation prize k
used in our model, in the absence of explicit time cost, and the parameters
in Hines’ model:
k =
α(1− π) + µC − µF
α + µC − µF . (20)
Note that the right hand side is positive for realistic choices of the
parameters. Naturally, π = 0 corresponds to k = 1, since any food parcel
found is uncontested. With µC = µF, the relation is simply k = 1− π.
The relation (20) completely maps the model by Hines onto our model. Thus,
the whole range of behaviours of Hines’ model is captured by the single value
of k. Specifically, we note that the stationary distribution characterising our
model and the corresponding stability analysis in Section 6 apply.
9.2 The model of Cannings and Whittaker
In (Cannings and Whittaker, 1995) the authors studied a model where
players repeatedly meet each other in the war of attrition game, with a score
of zero for the loser, i.e. k = 0, and with an explicit time cost c. The
waiting-times are restricted to the set of positive integers, and the players
wait one unit of time between games. In their model, as in Hines’ and ours,
it is assumed that players finishing faster get to play more frequently. In
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addition to this they also introduced discounting, where scores received
earlier in a sequence of games are valued higher.
We apply our method as described in Section 2 to analyse the model. We
find: Initial correlations between players decay as the evaluation period
proceeds. Hence, in the limit of long evaluation periods, and when the
discount rate is sufficiently low, the average fitness over the evaluation
period, for a player, equals the expected fitness in the equilibrium
distribution. The time between games ν = 1 gives µ(pa) = (2pa)
−1. Since ν is
constant, we can map the evolutionary dynamics onto the dynamics in the
absence of explicit time cost and with consolation prize k = c/(1 + c). In
Appendix B we derive the unique stationary distribution (involving all
waiting-times), for this model. With ρi as the fraction of the available
players with waiting-time i, and with ui as the corresponding fraction of the
population, we find
ρ1 = 4 a− 2 c
1 + 2 c
, u1 =
8 a (2 a− c)
1 + 2 c
,
where a = (3 + 6 c−√9 + 4 c+ 4 c2)/8. For i ≥ 2, we find
ρi= (4 a− 1− 2 c)
(√
1 + a2 − 1− a
)(√
1 + a2 − a
)i−2
and
ui=
2 a ρi
[
a + 2 a c− (1 + a)ρi − (
√
1 + a2 − 1)(5 + 2 c+ ρi)
]
(
1 + a−√1 + a2
)2
(1 + 2 c)
. (21)
Numerical simulations show that the dynamics converge to the stationary
distribution when c & 0.13. For smaller costs, the dynamics seems to
converge to a stable limit cycle. Thus, the dynamical properties of this
model are similar to the dynamical properties of our model where
µ(pa) ∝ p−1a , and where the waiting-time may take any positive value.
10 Discussion and concluding remarks
We study the evolutionary dynamics of a population, where individuals
interact according to a social dynamics. In particular we study a variation of
the war of attrition (or the waiting-game) in which the explicit time cost is
replaced by an implicit cost, due to less frequent game participation for
those involved in longer contests. Players are characterised by the
waiting-time, the time they are prepared to wait before they give up to the
opponent. The player with the larger waiting-time gets the score 1, while the
other player gets the consolation price k ∈ [0, 1]. Players are in one of two
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states: either they are engaged in a game or they are available for entering a
new game. We analyse the time evolution of the distribution of strategies in
the population when the population size is fixed, and players produce
offspring that survive to the next generation in proportion to their fitness.
The fitness of a player is a product of two factors: the first is the expected
score per game, determined by the probability of winning against a
randomly chosen player, and the second is the number of games played per
unit time. There are two ways a player may attempt to increase its fitness: it
can either try to increase the probability of winning the games played (by
increasing the waiting-time), or to increase the expected number of games
(by decreasing the waiting-time). In general, it is not possible for a player to
have both a high chance of winning a game, and to play many games per
unit of time. Thus, the second factor reflects an implicit time cost.
We summarise our results as follows: First, the average fitness in the
population is determined by the fraction of the population that is available,
or equivalently, by the average duration of games.
Second, when players follow deterministic strategies there is, for all k, a
unique stationary population involving all waiting-times. When the
consolation prize k approaches the score of 1 for winning a game, we find
that the stationary distribution is characterised by strategies with small
waiting-times. For small k, the stationary distribution is characterised by
large waiting-times: as k approaches zero, the average waiting-time in the
stationary population diverges.
Third, the stability of the stationary state depends on the consolation prize
k. The stationary state is evolutionarily stable for large enough values,
k & 0.5196 for constant µ, and k & 0.6738 for µ ∝ p−1a . Below this level the
evolutionary stability is lost, but the system exhibits a weaker form of
stability, dynamic stability, when k & 0.1675 for constant µ, and when
k & 0.1197 for µ ∝ p−1a . Here perturbations may lead to a transient
oscillatory behaviour, after which the system is brought back to the
stationary state again. Although the perturbations eventually vanish, the
transient period may be very long. For small k the stationary state is
unstable, showing an oscillatory behaviour in the average waiting-time. It
shall be noted that, in this model evolutionary stability does not imply
dynamical stability.
Fourth, the numerical simulations indicate that the stationary distribution is
a global attractor when k is in the dynamically stable region. When the
stationary state is not dynamically stable, the dynamics seems to converge
to a stable limit cycle from any initial distribution. The period and shape of
the limit cycle depends on k.
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Fifth, there is an affine transformation of the fitness values in a population,
from a population with positive time cost c to a population with no explicit
time cost, where the new consolation price k˜ is now a function of the explicit
time cost, the original consolation price k, and the expected time between
games in the original population. When the time between games is
independent of the fraction of available players in the population, the time
evolution of the two populations are thus the same.
Sixth, the implicit time cost is increasing with the explicit time cost c. Thus,
players with small waiting-time have an advantage in that they are less
affected by this cost.
Seventh, the models of Hines (1977) and Cannings and Whittaker (1994)
both correspond to a time between games independent from the population
composition, hence our methods and results apply to these models, when the
number of games per generation is large.
The oscillatory behaviour of the dynamics for small k can be intuitively
understood by the following simplified arguments: if the consolation price k
is small, and the average expected waiting-time for each game is low, the
players gradually increase their waiting-time to win more games, driving the
maximum waiting-time up again as in an arms race. Here, the contribution
from the increase in the score per game is more important than the decrease
in the number of games that follows. Eventually, when the average expected
waiting-time becomes high enough, a small fraction of the population can
gain profit by choosing a low waiting-time. The lower the waiting-time, the
sooner the switch becomes advantageous. Now, the implicit time cost due to
long games is so high that it is better to play many games but to win few of
them. As more players switch to short waiting-times, the average expected
waiting-time decreases and at some stage an arms race is started. This
creates the observed patterns of oscillations (see Fig. 2).
The domain of dynamical and evolutionary stability was found by expanding
a perturbation of the stationary distribution in a suitable function basis to a
finite size, and then evaluating the eigenvalues for this approximation
numerically. This proves only that the distribution is unstable when we can
identify a perturbation that grows. It remains to be rigorously proven that
the distribution is stable in these domains, and to calculate the exact values
of k where the distribution goes from stable to unstable as k decreases.
Another open question is whether there are eigenvalues in (17) with a
magnitude arbitrarily close to zero. If so, there are perturbations that decay
arbitrarily slowly, and it is then necessary to analyse the model also in the
situation where perturbations are frequent compared to the relaxation time
of the perturbations. This can be modelled by modifying the replicator
dynamics to take into account the rates by which mutations transform one
23
strategy into another.
The players with zero waiting-time play a central role in determining the
shape of the stationary distribution. They never win a game unless they play
against another player with waiting-time zero, but neither are they subject
to the duration-dependent costs: they play the maximum number of games
per unit of time, and they have no explicit time-cost. The fitness of these
players depends only on the fraction of available players in the population,
as does the average fitness in the population, and one can thus say that the
fitness at the stationary distribution is determined by the players with
waiting-time zero.
The approach presented with social dynamics giving rise to non-trivial
dependence of the duration of the game can be useful for studies of
game-theoretic problems in general. One example could be the study of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with refusal in which a player may quit a repeated
game when encountering a deviation from cooperation. In that case the role
of the duration could be the opposite, since it would be an advantage being
engaged with cooperative players for a longer time.
We conclude with a remark on empirical testing of the model. In the
literature, field surveys of the duration of contests are compared to theory in
order to assess the validity of the model (see e.g. Parker and Thompson,
1980). In our model, the duration of contests in the stationary population is
exponentially distributed, as it is in the classical war of attrition. Hence, we
conclude that this observable cannot be used to distinguish between the two
models. In order to recover the distribution of waiting-times in the
population, it is necessary to perform experiments where the pairing process
is controlled. If the implicit time-cost is prominent in the population, we
expect an under-representation of players with short waiting-time in the
population, compared to what is expected from an exponential distribution.
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A Dynamic stability evaluation details
We show how to represent the linearised dynamics in terms of two matrices,
corresponding to the linear operators L and A, and derive explicit
expressions for the elements of these matrices for the linearisation of the
stationary state.
With the infinitesimal perturbation δg(s) = ǫ(s) of the state g(s), we give
explicit expressions for the operators L and A:
L[ǫ(s)] =h(s) ǫ(s)− (1− k) g(s)
∫ 1
0
max(ln s, ln t) ǫ(t) dt
A[ǫ(s)] =m(s) ǫ(s) + g(s)
∫ 1
0
dt Sˆ(s, t) ǫ(t)) −
− gˆ2L[ǫ(s)]− 2 gˆ g(s) h(s)
∫ 1
0
ǫ(t) dt. (A.1)
25
where Sˆ(s, t) = θ(t− s) + k θ(s− t). We also identify the adjoint operators,
with respect to the inner product
∫ 1
0 v(s)w(s) ds of v(s) and w(s):
L†[ǫ(s)] = h(s) ǫ(s)− (1− k)
∫ 1
0
g(t) max(ln s, ln t) ǫ(t) dt
A†[ǫ(s)] =m(s) ǫ(s) +
∫ 1
0
g(t) Sˆ(t, s) ǫ(t)) dt −
− gˆ2L†[ǫ(s)]− 2 gˆ
∫ 1
0
g(t) h(t) ǫ(t) dt. (A.2)
At the stationary distribution, L is self-adjoint but A is not. If we apply the
linear operators L, A and A† to powers of s, we get
L[sn] = 1− k
(n + 1)2
+ sn − (1− k)
[
1 + (n+ 1)−2
]
sn+1
A[sn] =−2 + n− k
(n+ 1)2
+ 2
1− k
n + 1
s− n 1− k
(n+ 1)2
sn+1
A†[sn] =−4 + 3n+ k (n
2 − 2)
(n+ 1)2(n + 2)
+
(1− k)(n+ 2)
(n+ 1)2
sn+1, (A.3)
so polynomials over the interval [0, 1] are suitable as a basis for expanding L
and A. We choose the shifted Legendre polynomials P¯i = Pi(2s− 1), with
the property (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972):
∫ 1
0
P¯i(s) P¯j(s) ds =
1
2
∫ 1
−1
Pi(x)Pj(x) dx =
δij
1 + 2i
. (A.4)
We now insert the expansion φ(s) =
∑n
i=0 ai P¯i(s) in the eigenvalue relation
(17):
γ L[
n∑
j=0
aj P¯j(s) ] = A[
n∑
j=0
aj P¯j(s) ].
Since the set of Legendre polynomials form a basis, the projection on all
P¯i(s) must be zero, we have that for all i ≥ 0,
γ
∫ 1
0
P¯i(s)
n∑
j=0
aj L[ P¯j(s) ] ds =
∫ 1
0
P¯i(s)
n∑
j=0
aj L[ P¯j(s) ] ds,
which we may write as
γ
n∑
j=0
aj
∫ 1
0
ds P¯i(s)L[ P¯j(s) ] =
n∑
j=0
aj
∫ 1
0
ds P¯i(s)L[ P¯j(s) ].
By defining matrices L and A with elements
26
Lij =
∫ 1
0
P¯i(s)L[P¯j(s)] ds and
Aij =
∫ 1
0
P¯i(s)A[P¯j(s)] ds =
∫ 1
0
A†[P¯i(s)] P¯j(s) ds. (A.5)
we can express (17) as an eigenvalue problem in the coefficient vector a:
γ
n∑
j=0
Lij aj =
n∑
j=0
Aij aj .
Note that due to the normalisation (14), we need to take a0 = (1− k) a1/3.
Since any polynomial of degree n can be written as a linear combination of
Legendre polynomials P0(s) . . . Pn(s), it follows from (A.4) that P¯n(s) is
orthogonal to any polynomial with degree n− 1 or less on the interval [0, 1].
From this follows that when i > j + 1, Lij and Aij are zero since L[P¯j(s)]
and A[P¯j(s)] are polynomials of degree j + 1. When j > i+ 1, we have that
Lji = Lij = 0 since L is self-adjoint. Since A†[P¯i(s)] is a polynomial of degree
i+ 1, we see that Aij = 0. To conclude, both Lij and Aij are zero when
|i− j| > 1.
The shifted Legendre polynomials obey the recurrence relation
(Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972)
(n+ 1)P¯n+1(s)− (1 + 2n)(2 s− 1)P¯n(s) + n P¯n−1(s) = 0.
In conjunction with the above mentioned properties of the shifted Legendre
polynomials, we used this recurrence relation to calculate the elements of Lij
and Aij:
Lij =


1 when i = j = 0
1
1 + 2 i
− i
2 + i− 1
2 i (1 + i)(1 + 2 i)
(1− k) when i = j and i ≥ 1
− 1 + i
2
2 i (2 i− 1)(2 i+ 1) (1− k) when j = i− 1
− 2 + 2 i+ i
2
2 (1 + i)(1 + 2 i)(3 + 2 i)
(1− k) when j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
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and
Aij =


−1 when i = j = 0
1− k
3
when i = 1 and j = 0
− 1− k
2 i (1 + i)(1 + 2 i)
when i = j and i ≥ 1
− (i− 1) (1− k)
2 i (2 i− 1)(2 i+ 1) when j = i− 1 and i ≥ 2
(2 + i) (1− k)
2 (1 + i)(1 + 2 i)(3 + 2 i)
when j = i+ 1
0 otherwise
B Stationary distribution for discrete waiting-times
Here, we derive the stationary distribution for a population with
deterministic strategies, ν = 1 and with waiting-times restricted to positive
integers, in the absence of explicit time-cost (c = 0). Note that since ν is
constant, any combination of consolation prize and explicit time cost may be
mapped to an effective consolation prize and no explicit time cost, as shown
in Section 8.
With φi =
∑i
j=1 ρj , the expected duration of game for a player with
waiting-time i is Di =
∑i−1
j=1 jρj + i (1− φi−1), and the expected score for the
player is Si = φi−1 + (1 + k)ρi/2 + k (1− φi).
At the stationary solution, we have Si = f¯ + f¯ Di where
f¯ = f¯ = (1 + k)pa/2. This implies Si+1 − Si = f¯ (Di+1 −Di), or equivalently,
ρi + ρi+1 = 2 f¯ (1− φi)/(1− k), which may be written as
φi+1 + 2 a φi − φi−1 = 2 a, where a = f¯/(1− k), for i ≥ 2. The unique
solution is
φi =
1
2
√
1 + a2
(
−
√
1 + a2 − a
)i−1 [
1− a−
√
1 + a2 +
(
a +
√
1 + a2
)
A−B
]
+
1
2
√
1 + a2
(√
1 + a2 − a
)i−1 [
a− 1−
√
1 + a2 +
(√
1 + a2 − a
)
A +B
]
+1
for i ≥ 1, where A and B are constants to be determined. Since√
1 + a2 + a > 1 for all a > 0, the factor (−√1 + a2 − a)i−1 grows without
bound, so we must take B = 1− a−√1 + a2 + (a+√1 + a2)A in order to
have φ∞ = 1. For i = 1, we find φ1 = A = ρ1. With S1 =
1+k
2
ρ1 + k (1− ρi)
and D1 = 1, the stationarity condition gives ρ1 = 4 a− 2 k/(1− k).
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We must now solve for the value of a. A simple calculation gives
Si − (1− k) aDi =
1− 2 a3 (1− k) + a k + 2 a2 k −√1 + a2 (1 + 2 a k − 2 a2 (1− k))(
1 + a−√1 + a2
) (√
1 + a2 − a
)2
for i ≥ 2. Setting this to zero, we find that there is one valid solution:
a =
3
8 (1− k)

1 + k −
√
1− 14
9
k + k2

 .
Another solution corresponds to negative fitness values, which is not possible
here. With this solution, and using ui = pa ρi (1 +Di) and
pa = 2 (1− k) a/(1 + k), we find
ρ1 = 4 a− 2k
1− k and u1 =
16 (1− k) a2 − 8 a k
1 + k
,
and for i ≥ 2 we have
ρi=
(
4 a− 1 + k
1− k
)(√
1 + a2 − 1− a
) (√
1 + a2 − a
)i−2
and
ui=
1 + k +
(
a+
√
1 + a2
)
(1− 4 a (1− k) + k)
1 + k
ρi −
−
2 a
(
a+
√
1 + a2
)
(1− k)(
1 + a−√1 + a2
)2
(1 + k)
ρ2i .
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